Morality, Pragmatism and Killing

It is often the case that when a seemingly axiomatic principle is examined under the light of reason, an unexpected degree of depth and complexity reveals itself. Descartes and his meditations illustrate this as well as anything. The apparently unmistakable proposition that I am now sitting at my desk before a computer becomes an unfounded assumption when scrutinised via the process of methodic doubt. Even the claim that I exist is not taken for granted, and requires as support an argument which is perhaps the most famous in all of philosophy: I think, therefore I am.

Why is killing wrong? This question, like many in philosophy, applies to a belief which is commonly held, yet despite this the answer can be quite elusive. Attempts to come to a conclusive response follow diverse paths. Some are derived from religious texts or commandments, while others centre on people’s innate right to life. However, to ask why killing is wrong conflates a variety of actions so wide that they include the bombing of enemy positions on a battlefield and the administration of a lethal dose of poison to a willing recipient. It is clear that all societies draw great distinctions between different forms of killing, as is the case with groups within those societies. The origins for these distinctions are an important element of understanding of the moral issues surrounding the act of ending the life of another human being.

The killing of an innocent person is considered by many to be the most serious of all transgressions. It is generally regarded as unjustifiable under any circumstances, and is unsurpassed by any crime in terms of legal penalties and moral objections. Most people have a powerful and innate aversion to the concept of killing in general, and the most intense aspect of this aversion is reserved for the specific act of killing the innocent. When examined from an evolutionary perspective, this aversion is quite understandable. Imagine the hypothesised state of nature which philosophers like Thomas Hobbes believed to exist before organised societies. It is clear that within that world, where life meant a daily fight for survival, individuals were less suited to that task than groups, due to the fact that the pooled skills, resources and numbers which benefit a gathering of people far outweigh the strengths of even the most powerful individual in isolation. Therefore it stands to reason that those individuals who were suited to life within a group were more likely to be survive and pass on their genes. A major element in the question of one’s suitability to life in a group setting is how one interacts with other members within that group. It is easy to see that individuals who had an aversion to wantonly killing their fellow people would be less likely to damage the group by murdering other innocent members. The benefits of the group over the individual would mean that the genetically predicated elements of this aversion, a key aspect of group membership, would be very likely to be perpetuated. There may well have existed many individuals who lacked this trait, who didn’t feel disinclined to kill other groups members, but their lack of an aversion to killing (or at least an inability to match the behaviour of others in this regard) would not appear to be one which would be favoured by natural selection: it is quite clear that a disregard for the lives of others would be deleterious to one’s chances of passing on one’s genes in any situation where membership of a group is a key element in improving one’s chances of survival and breeding. Conversely, a strong aversion to killing other members of one’s group or species would be highly advantageous in these circumstances. The moral questions we now associate with killing appear to be secondary to the simple pragmatism of the evolutionary process in this ungoverned state of nature which predated human society as we know it. In a modern context, Homo Sapiens don’t find themselves in such a grave state of existential jeopardy as that which marks the early stages of any species’ development. The killing of one innocent member of a large and organised modern society no longer results in a drastic reduction in the other members’ chances of surviving, but at the same time it represents an assault, however small, on one of the core principles of our society and our existence. The simple pragmatism enforced by natural selection has been moved from its former prominence by the stability of modern society, and in its place moral principles have grown.

The question of justifiable killing is a controversial one. Western society appears to be moving away from capital punishment, while many countries within its structure continue to wage wars which have as their consequence the deaths of many people. The moral principles which replaced evolutionary pragmatism have much to say about the subject of the death penalty, but first I shall propose a situation which may have been antecedent to these considerations. While the killing of innocent members of a society was a potentially destructive act within our early societies, the killing of an individual whose conduct threatens the group could well have been advantageous. This is the ultimate origin of law and the morals from which they are derived: those behaviours which may threaten the survival of the group are outlawed. Thus morals are far from being abstract and arbitrary rulings, in fact are at their most basic level the principles of survival. One who transgresses against the principles of survival is not beneficial to group’s overall chances of enduring, so the elimination of this individual effectively constitutes the removal of a factor which impedes survival. In a situation where the survival of one’s species is fragile, this equation is all the consideration that can be afforded. However, as Homo Sapiens became a well established species, and, as mentioned above, morals began to take the place of pure pragmatism, the killing of those who transgress became a more complicated issue. Those who seek to punish the transgressor are members of the society against which the crime was committed. Therefore, as members of a society, they, in all likelihood, posses the trait of having an innate aversion to killing. In times past the simple expediency which the evolutionary process enforced meant the aversion was set aside, but when morals replaced the binary advantageous/disadvantageous judgement, the natural aversion to killing could assert itself, even if it was being applied to one who assaulted society. In order to avoiding killing, we introduced alternative punishments: prison sentences, exile and other sub lethal penalties. Whether or not the killing of transgressors is justifiable in a setting where it is not entirely necessary is a question which has been born out of the emergent existential security of our species, and therefore is largely based on the level of one’s subjective aversion to killing. Given the fact that in a modern setting, the power to kill those who attack society has been placed in the hands of representatives (governments, sovereigns etc), there will always be opposition to capital punishment. The natural aversion to killing, which is sure to exist within many members of a population, will cause people to rise against the actions of a representative who decides that the killing of transgressors is an appropriate punishment, as the actions of a representative reflect on the society whom they govern.

If the killing of innocent people is at one end of the spectrum of public acceptance (i.e it is almost universally regarded as unacceptable in any circumstances), then the killing of enemy soldiers in warfare is at the other. However, the question of whether or not the war is considered just is of great importance when it comes to its public acceptance. Fundamentally, it is a question which reaches past the sanitised comforts of modernity and back into the violent origins of our species. For a war to be considered just, and therefore for the killing of other human beings in its context to be acceptable, the circumstances of the conflict must be such that they push our society back into a state of existential jeopardy. When our survival, or the survival of our society, is threatened, the killing of those who are creating this threat is morally unambiguous. In fact, moral considerations once again become secondary in importance, and the simple pragmatism of survival rises to its former state of prominence. World War Two is often held as an example of a just conflict. The spread of Nazi tyranny constituted a very real threat to the lives and societies of those who fought to stop it and therefore the killing of Nazi soldiers did not produce a moral outcry. It is difficult to consider a war just if the existence of a society and its members has not been threatened. The absence of this threat means that the pragmatism of survival doesn’t enter the equation. Instead, the moral codes which exist in a stable, safe society are applied to the prospect of killing in these circumstances, and the innate aversion to killing which most of the population possess wins out. For example, a war waged in order to secure resources would be seen as unacceptable to the public, and a moral outcry would result.

Because of its importance to structure of society and the innate and conditioned proclivities which this importance has and does imbue us with, not killing has reached a position of great significance within most human populations. It is seen by some as an absolute. It has been applied not only to human beings but to animals too. These considerations are all products of the stability of our modern societies. We can get by without killing and eating animals today, so in this society it is a moral rather than pragmatic question, whereas a shipwrecked individual on a deserted island with limited nutritional options will soon find themselves back in the world of pragmatism. A criminal who killed other human beings is dangerous, but he is not a threat to the structure of society as a whole, so he does not place us in a position of existential jeopardy and therefore our moral codes are applicable, whereas on an individual basis the pragmatism of self preservation would certainly outweigh any moral concerns towards killing if the perpatrator were threatening your survival. The further we get from the violent world of survival, the more comfortable our existence becomes. More and more we can afford to eschew that which we consider distasteful, and stability takes the place of tumult. However, as long as we exist there is the possibility that our existence could be threatened, and in the most ancient recesses of our minds the simple rules which govern the world of basic survival lie waiting for the moment when that threat emerges.